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Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas
Takes the First Step in Holding HMOs
Liable for Bad Medical Decisions
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your child becomes very ill. You take him to the doctor
knowing that medical treatment will be covered through your health care
insurance. Your child initially requires an operation and a week-long
hospital stay, however, after five days the doctors need to extend the
hospital stay for another week. Because your insurance coverage is through
a health maintenance organization (HMO), the doctor must request approval
from the HMO for the extended stay. The HMO denies the extended stay
and the doctor discharges your child. After returning home, your child
develops complications and must return to the hospital. The complications
lead to a new infection with new risks which could result in death. You
are upset and believe that if your child had been allowed the extra week, the
doctors could have prevented the new ailment. After consulting an attorney,
you decide to bring a medical malpractice suit. Who do you sue? The
doctor, who against his medical judgment discharged your child because the
insurance would not pay for the extended stay? Or the HMO who refused
to authorize the extended stay despite the doctor's request? This scenario
is becoming more common as health care becomes intertwined with
managed care entities and causes conflict. Health care and managed care
conflict with each other because each has different goals and interests.
While health care is concerned with providing adequate and effective
medical treatment, managed care is concerned with decreasing health care
costs.
Managed care entities represent their interests by influencing consumer
demand and provider supply. In essence, health care reform attempts to cut
costs by not only adjusting current medical practice patterns, but also by
influencing the consumer as to what medical services are actually necessary.' The newly managed health care plans intend to make consumers
more sensitive to the cost of their health care while providing them with

1. Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical MalpracticeLaw and Health Care Cost Containment
Lessonsfor Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1301 (1997).
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incentives to seek more efficient care.' However, these cost efficient
approaches ignore an important non-economic factor responsible for current
medical practice patterns-the law of medical malpractice.
This Comment examines the conflict between current medical
malpractice law and the reform measures aimed at decreasing health care
costs. With an increase in the number of people enrolling in managed care
entities there is a need to resolve this conflict and to provide reasonable and
attainable alternatives for patients injured by negligent medical decisions.
Several states have seen the need to resolve this conflict and have passed
legislation aimed at resolving the conflict by holding both doctors and
managed care entities liable for medical malpractice when the evidence so
indicates. However, such state legislation may not be sufficient by itself
because federal legislation still provides a way in which managed care
entities can shield themselves from liability.
Examining the parameters of this conflict, Part I of this Comment
explores the doctrine and background of medical malpractice and the
background of managed care entities. Part II.A examines the history of
managed care liability in state-funded programs that use utilization review.
Part II.B examines the history of managed care entities in private sector
utilization review. Part III.A explores the defense of federal preemption
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) often used by
managed care entities. Part III.B explores the prohibition of the corporate
practice of medicine, yet another defense used by managed care entities.
Part IV evaluates a newly passed Texas law with regard to HMO liability
in medical malpractice cases. Finally, Part V explores the effects of this
new legislation with regard to defenses for HMOs and the impact of this law
on other states.
I. DOCTRINE AND BACKGROUND OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND MANAGED CARE ENTITIES

Medical malpractice is a tort action based on the negligence of a health
care provider.4 In a suit for medical malpractice a plaintiff must establish
the following elements: (1) the existence of a duty to use a certain standard
of care in relation to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a showing
that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (4)

2. Id.
3. Id.at 1302.
4. Carla Jensen Hamborg, Medical Utilization Review: The New Frontierfor Medical
Malpractice Claims?, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 113, 117 (1992).
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actual damages.' The tort of medical malpractice holds medical providers
to a certain standard of care in their treatment. Furthermore, society gives
physicians the sole authority to define appropriate health care outcomes.6
In this regard, under tort law, physicians are obligated to provide appropriate and adequate care without taking into consideration cost or patient
resources.' Yet, by forcing physicians to alter their practices in an effort
to contain medical costs, cost containment plans by managed care entities
are on a collision course with the tort system.8
The rapid increase in the cost of health care has increased the number
of managed care organizations, including health maintenance organizations,
whose main purposes are to provide health care at a lower cost to the
consumer. Likewise, this increase in cost has caused consumers to seek
alternative ways to pay for health care9 with approximately 150 million
people in the United States participating in HMOs or other managed-care
plans.' ° Of the one trillion dollars spent annually on health care, 40% is
spent by these 150 million people enrolled in managed care plans, which
suggests that consumers are aware of the high cost of health care and are
seeking ways, including adopting reform in health care, to decrease the
costs." The public has been willing to adopt reform in health care
because of the increase in medical costs.' Private employers and insurance companies are moving away from traditional fees-for-service insurance
plans to managed care programs in the hopes of containing medical costs. 3
"Managed care" is a comprehensive term used to describe a variety of
processes, including reduced-price purchasing agreements with health care
providers to preauthorization of facility admissions or surgical procedures. 4
Due to the low cost health care they provide, managed care organizationswhich include HMOs, independent practice associations (IPAs) and preferred

5. Hamborg, supra note 4, at 117 (quoting from W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER

AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)).

6. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1302.

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Domenick C. DiCicco Jr., Liability of the HMO for the Medical Negligence of its
Providers, ANDREWS HEALTH L. LrrIG. REP. 22, Nov. 1996.
10. Earl Ubell, You Can Get Quality Care in an HMO World, PARADE MAGAZINE,
Sept. 14, 1997 at 10.
11. Ubell, supra note 10, at 10. Managed care plans are unique because they are
designed to reduce health care costs by limiting choices of physicians and hospitals and
usually cover only the cost of treatment that is "medically necessary."
12. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1297.
13. Hamborg, supra note 4, at 114.
14. Id.
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provider organizations (PPOs)- have become a major force in health
care. 5 For a fixed pre-paid amount, HMOs will accept the responsibility
and risk for ensuring that medical services are paid for and that basic and
supplemental health care services are provided to their enrollees.' 6 By
using various cost containment measures, 7 such as having doctors gain
approval from the HMO for a treatment before rendering medical treatment
to a patient, HMOs are able to provide low cost health care.' The HMOs'
medical review board then recommends a treatment authorized by the
HMO. 9 Insistence on out-patient treatments and fixed
hospital stays are
20
two other cost-containment methods used by HMOs.
Since HMOs make medical decisions regarding patient treatment,
HMOs along with physicians should be responsible for negligence in
providing health care to their enrollees.2' The medical care that an enrollee
receives is dependent not only on the medical decision of the treating
physician, but also on the decision of the HMO as to what type and how
much care should be received. Similarly, these medical decisions directly
affect the medical care of the patient because negligent decisions, with
regard to the type and amount of care, cause injury to the patient. However,
HMOs as well as other managed care organizations, use the legal rules
regarding the practice of medicine and licensing requirements to insulate
themselves from liability.22
II. UTILIZATION REVIEW

Tort law holds physicians liable for injuries that their patients suffer
when the care given to the patient falls below a certain standard. 23 The24
malpractice tort suggests that there is a "best way" to practice medicine
which obligates physicians to make medical decisions without regard to the
cost of treatment. 25 This idea of patient care is in direct contradiction to
15. Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking
Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419, 421 (1997).
16. DiCicco, supra note 9, at 22.
17. Robert Vilensky, The Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations,69 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 20 (1997).
18. Vilensky, supra note 17, at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the Quality of Care,
31 GA. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1315.
24. Id.
25. Id.

1998]

WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDICAL

the new cost-containment programs. Utilization controls and financial riskpooling require the physician to provide service and care in a cost-efficient
manner, while malpractice law dictates the physician ignore the cost of
services provided.26 Since tort law recognizes that physicians have the sole
power to make medical decisions, physicians also bear the sole liability for
those negligent medical decisions.27 Moreover, since statutes and common
law rules prohibit the corporate practice of medicine," an entity cannot
negligently practice medicine.29 Similarly, before 1960, courts believed
that hospitals were incapable of exercising control over experienced
physicians and thus hospitals could not be found to be vicariously liable for
the malpractice of their physicians.3" However, as medical decisionmaking evolved, that is, as more people became involved with making
medical decisions, courts no longer immunized hospitals from vicarious
liability for the malpractice of their physicians. 3 Instead, courts created
new torts that allow plaintiffs to sue both hospitals and HMOs based on
corporate negligence32 and agency theories.33 Given the availability of
these causes of action it would appear that HMOs and hospitals can no
longer insulate themselves from liability when practicing cost containment
measures, but just the opposite is true. Managed care entities in both the
public and private sector can still insulate themselves from liability.
A. LIABILITY IN STATE FUNDED PROGRAMS

The leading case decided on allegedly negligent prospective utilization
review was Wickline v. State of California.34 Efficiency, appropriateness,
and medical necessity are things that are evaluated during medical utilization

26. Id. at 1317.
27. Id.at 1318.
28. Id.Texas is one of the states that statutorily prohibits the corporate practice of
medicine. See also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.26(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that
nothing in Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act should be construed to permit HMOs
to practice medicine).
29. Frankel, supra note 1, at 1318.
30. Id.at 1319.
31. Id.at 1321.
32. Id.
33. Id. See also Jim M. Perdue & Stephen R. Baxley, Cutting Costs-Cutting Care:
Can Texas ManagedHealth Care Systems and HMOs be Liablefor the Medical Malpractice
of Physicians?, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 32 (1995). Courts have used theories of apparent
agency and agency by estoppel to hold hospitals and HMOs vicariously liable for
malpractice. Id.
34. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986), appeal dism'd, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
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review.35 Usually preauthorization, also known as prospective utilization
review, requires that the physician gain approval for any medical treatment
or procedure prior to the treatment. 36 In Wickline, the court held the State
of California not liable on the grounds that the plaintiff had not made an
evidentiary showing that the treatment provided was inconsistent with the
usual standard of medical practice. 37 Lois Wickline, a Medi-Cal recipient,
needed surgery to replace part of an obstructed artery with a synthetic
graft. 38 As required by the Medi-Cal requirements, Ms. Wickline's
physician sought preauthorization from California's medical assistance
program (Medi-Cal) for the procedure and for ten days of hospital care,
both of which were authorized.39 Ms. Wickline experienced several
complications after the surgery and her physicians requested an eight day
extension of her hospital stay.'" A Medi-Cal consultant approved only four
additional days.4 ' At the end of the four days, Ms. Wickline's condition
had not worsened so her physician discharged her, even though he disagreed
with Medi-Cal's decision.42 After returning home, Ms. Wickline developed
a blood clot in her leg where the surgery was performed and was rushed to
the hospital for further treatment. 43 Unfortunately it was too late, and Ms.
Wickline's leg had to be amputated after repeated attempts to revive
circulation failed. 44 Ms. Wickline sued the State of California claiming
negligence on the part of the Medi-Cal consultant for the loss of her leg.45
The jury returned a verdict in Ms. Wickline's favor, 46 but the appellate court
reversed on appeal. 47 The appellate court found the Medi-Cal consultant's

35. Hamborg, supra note 4, at 116. Such review can take place before, during, or after
treatment and the manner in which such review is conducted will vary according to when it
is conducted. Id.
36. Id. Approving or denying payment for the proposed procedure is all that a
utilization review entity does, however in order to receive treatment or a procedure the
patient must meet certain pre-established criteria. Id.
37. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
38. Id. at 663.

39. Id. at 663-64.

40. Id. at 664.
41. Id. at 665.
42. Id. at 667.
43. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667-68.
44. Id. at 668.
45. Id. at 662. Ms. Wickline did not sue the hospital or any of the physicians who
treated her. Her surgeon testified that if she had been allowed the eight day extension he
would have detected the clotting at an earlier date and likely would have been able to save
the leg. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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decision was made in accordance with the state Welfare Code governing
Medi-Ca 8 and the ultimate decision to discharge was made by the
surgeon.4 9 Moreover, the court held that Medi-Cal's decision did not in
50
any way affect the medical decision-making process and that Ms.
Wickline failed to prove that the Medi-Cal decision proximately caused the
amputation of her leg.5
B. LIABILITY IN PRIVATE SECTOR UTILIZATION REVIEW-

While Wickline dealt with medical utilization review in regard to a state
53
funded medical program,52 Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California
was a medical malpractice action based on private sector utilization
review.54 Wilson involved the suicide of a teenager shortly after his
discharge from a Los Angeles hospital where he had received treatment for
55
major depression, drug dependence, and anorexia. The teenager left the
hospital because his insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, denied
payment of insurance benefits and his parents could not afford to pay for the
treatment.56 Denial of payment was based on a review decision made by
the Western Medical Review Organization. 57 The parents sued Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Alabama, Western Medical, and Blue Cross of Southern
California alleging that the result in payment denial was the proximate cause
of the death of their son.58 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants 59 based on Wickline, but the decision was reversed
by the court of appeals. 60 In their defense, the defendants relied on the
language in Wickline which stated that "the exclusive responsibility for a
discharge rests with the physician.,, 6 The Wilson court stated that Wickline
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 662.
271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 878.

61.

Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (citing Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 810).

55. Id. at 877.
56. Id. at 878. When payment for treatment has been denied it is not uncommon for
patients to forego the treatment because they cannot afford to pay for it themselves.
Hamborg, supra note 4, at 116.
57. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
58. Id. at 880-81. Both Blue Cross of Southern California and Blue Cross of Alabama
were named defendants because there was an agreement between the two for California Blue
Cross to provide the benefits of the insurance policy between Alabama and plaintiffs.
59. Id. at 878.
60. Id. at 885.
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dicta misconstrued the standard for determining joint tort liability 62 and
then quoting from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, determined that
liability would result if an actor's conduct was a "substantial factor in
bringing about the harm. 63 Based on the substantial factor test, u the
case was remanded for determination of liability.65
Wilson sounds
favorable to plaintiffs because the substantial factor test appears to give
plaintiffs a shot at suing health plans and HMOs. However, winning is still
difficult because a plaintiff must prove that the denial of the care was the
reason the injury occurred. These two decisions make it difficult for
plaintiffs to sue health plans and HMOs for denying certain care because
courts are unwilling to make the determination that HMOs are actually
making medical decisions when utilization review techniques are used.
Courts are hesitant to go as far as saying that utilization review involves
medical decision making because the purpose of utilization review is to
accept or deny payment of treatment not to determine whether the treatment
is appropriate.
III. DEFENSES FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Even more problematic is the notion that even if plaintiffs can
overcome the substantial factor test for liability, HMOs and health plans
may still be immune from liability because of viable defenses. HMOs may
not be liable because there remain two significant obstacles which a plaintiff
must overcome before liability will be imposed on HMOs: the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the prohibition
against the corporate practice of medicine. 66 Both of these obstacles allow
HMOs to escape liability when the HMO,through utilization review, has
denied or limited health care to a patient. Breaking the barrier of either of
these is a difficult task for a plaintiff.
A. ERISA PREEMPTION

ERISA 67 was enacted in 1974 by Congress to ensure that employees
who received benefits from an employer received the appropriate benefits,

62.
63.
(1964)).
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

Id. at 885.
Id. The case was denied review in October 1990.
Perdue, supra note 33, at 59-64.
29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461.

§ 431
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and said benefits were to be regulated by ERISA.68 ERISA is an extensive

federal statute and a major reason states are not allowed to control litigation
in the area of HMO malpractice. 69

Many plaintiffs who have attempted

to sue HMOs for malpractice have been unsuccessful because of ERISA

preemption. ERISA preemption hurts plaintiffs because of the remedies
available. Under ERISA, the only recoverable remedies are reinstatement
in the plan, reimbursement of benefits, making the plan whole, or giving a
70 State tort remedies, on
benefit that should have been given but was not.
the other hand, allow for pain and suffering, lost wages and cost of future
medical services. The ERISA statute applies to both multi-employer
pension programs and employee "welfare benefit plans"' which include
72
employer-sponsored medical insurance policies. Under the United States
73
Constitution federal laws are the supreme law of the land and in certain
circumstances federal laws preempt state laws so that state laws have no
effect. Preemption under ERISA can occur in one of two ways. First, a
state claim may be subject to "complete preemption" under section 502(a)
75
The
of ERISA,74 known as the statutes civil enforcement section.
"complete
the
intended
Congress
that
determined
Supreme Court has
preemption" doctrine to apply to state law causes of action which are
76
covered exclusively by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. A state

claim which falls within this section is considered a federal claim and

68. Liability: Court Set to Hear OralArguments on ERISA Preemption in Injury Suit,

HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 30, 1997, at d3.
69. Hamborg, supra note 4, at 128.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1991). However, if one is suing for benefits then the person
must be eligible for the benefits at the time of suit (must be living) or must have paid for the
benefits and is seeking reimbursement.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1101-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(1) (1988). "Welfare benefit plan" is defined as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase
of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits. Id.

BNA

73. U.S. CONST. art. VI.

74. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(A)(1991).
75. This section further provides that a civil action may be brought for any of five
reasons:
(1) for an administrator's refusal to supply information; (2) to recover benefits due
a plan or to enforce rights under a plan; (3) to clarify rights to future benefits under
a plan; (4) to sue for breach of fiduciary duty; or (5) to enjoin an act in violation
of ERISA or the plan terms and to redress violations. Id.
76. Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 354 (3rd Cir. 1995) (citing
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

creates federal subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of how the claim is
phrased in the complaint.77 For example, in a state medical malpractice
claim, if health insurance is through an employee benefit plan, ERISA may
prevent a tort suit that relates to the way a claim for benefits is handled.
Even if a state claim does not fall within the civil enforcement section,
the state claim may still be preempted by the "conflict preemption"
provision under section 514(a) of ERISA.78 A state law claim is preempted under this section if the state law in question "relates to an employee
benefit plan."79 However, section 514(a) is limited by section 514(b)(2)
which preserves any state law "which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities."8
The U.S. Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company v. Massachusetts8 clarified how the two sections interacted by
explaining that while the general preemption clause broadly preempts state
law, the savings clause appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking
power over insurance regulation.8 2 In Metropolitan Life, the Court held
that a state mandated benefit law was not preempted by ERISA because the
state law regulated insurance." The State of Massachusetts passed a state
law requiring that Massachusetts residents who were insured under general
health insurance policies or employee health care plans that covered hospital
and surgical expenses, also be provided with certain minimum mental health
care benefits. 4 The insurance companies argued that the state statute was
preempted by section 514(a) of ERISA 5 In reaching their decision, the
Court discussed that the States have extensively regulated the substantive
terms of group-health insurance contracts 6 and that mandated benefit
statutes are a manner in which states "regulate the substantive content of
health-insurance policies."87 The Court went on to state that the case law
supports that the regulation of substantive terms of insurance contracts is
within the savings clause as that "which regulates insurance."88 Thus, the

77. James Walker Smith, ERISA Preemption: No Longer a Sure Thing for HMOs, 14
No. 5 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 1, Mar. 1997.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1991).
79. Id. A law "relates to" an employee benefit plan if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan.
80. Id.

81. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
82. Id. at 724-725.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 746.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 729.
Id.
Id. at 742-43.
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Court found that the Massachusetts statute requiring minimum mental health
benefits was not preempted by ERISA because the statute regulates
insurance. 9
When complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff's state
claim is arguably preempted under section 514(a), the district court cannot
resolve the dispute regarding preemption because the court lacks removal
In fact, the district court lacks the power to do anything
jurisdiction.'
other than remand to the state court so that the preemption issue can be resolved.91 If preemption by the court is allowed the cause of action is
removed to federal court. The defendant will seek dismissal of the action
by arguing that state tort claims are preempted by ERISA because ERISA
regulates the claim and any remedies must be those established by ERISA.
Remedies under ERISA are insufficient because a person can sue for the
benefits and recovery only if they have paid for the benefits out of their own
pocket or if they are eligible for the benefits at that time. Due to the
ERISA preemption barrier, state courts are often unable to hear a plaintiff's
personal injury suit against health plans for wrongful medical determinations
made by the health plans.92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
health care plan's motion for summary judgment in Corcoran v. United
Healthcare Inc.93 The Corcoran court was required to make a determination as to whether ERISA preempted a state-law malpractice action against
94
a company that provided utilization review services to an ERISA plan.
Florence Corcoran became pregnant in early 1989 while she was an
5
employee of South Central Bell Telephone Company (Bell).9 During the
final months of her pregnancy her obstetrician, Dr. Collins, recommended
that she have complete bed rest.96 Mrs. Corcoran applied for temporary
97
disability benefits but they were denied even after a second opinion. As
Mrs. Corcoran neared her delivery date, Dr. Collins ordered her hospitalized
so that he could monitor the fetus around the clock.9" In accordance with
Mrs. Corcoran's benefit plan, Dr. Collins sought pre-certification from
Id. at 746.
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
Id.
Liability: Court Set to Hear Oral Arguments on ERISA Preemption in Injury Suit,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY Apr. 30, 1997 at d3.
93. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
94. Id. at 1332.
95. Id.
96. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.

97. Id.

98. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322-23.
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United Healthcare, Inc. (United) for the hospital stay.99 Despite Dr.
Collins' recommendation, United determined that hospitalization was not
necessary"° and instead allowed for 10 hours per day of home nursing
care.'0 1 During this time Mrs. Corcoran entered the hospital once, but was
released days later because United had not pre-certified her stay."° Days
later the fetus went into distress and died during a period of time when no
nurse was on duty.'0 3 The Corcorans' brought a wrongful death action in
Louisiana state court alleging that the negligence committed by Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Alabama (Blue Cross) and United resulted in the death
of their unborn child. 4" The defendants removed the action to federal court
on grounds that it was preempted by ERISA.0 5 The Corcorans argued
that the defendants actually made medical decisions and exercised medical
judgments which are outside the purview of ERISA preemption. 1°6 The
Fifth Circuit decided to affirm the defendant's summary judgment but
agreed with the Corcorans that United made medical decisions and gave
medical advice. The court clarified that United did so, however, in the
context of making a determination about the availability of benefits under
the health plan"° so ERISA preempted the Corcorans' tort claims.'
Other courts who have followed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
ERISA preemption have prevented many plaintiffs from successfully suing
HMOs or health plans for medical malpractice. 1 9 The complex nature of
99. Id. at 1324.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Corcoran; 965 F.2d at 1324. Mrs. Corcoran's benefit plan was administered by
Blue Cross pursuant to an agreement between Bell and Blue Cross. Id.
105. Id. ERISA preemption defense provides a sufficient basis for removal to federal
court. ERISA contains an explicit preemption clause, which provides, in relevant part:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) .....
29
U.S.C. § 1144.
106. Id. at 1330.
107. Id. at 1331.
108. Id. at 1339.
109. See Nealy v. United States Healthcare HMO, 844 F.Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993); Cathey v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1991); but see, Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875
F.Supp. 544 (S.D.Ill. 1994); Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.Supp. 983 (S.D. Pa.
1990); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F.Supp. 1137
(E.D. Va. 1997); Dukes v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995) (allow-

ing for HMOs to be sued for medical malpractice despite claims of ERISA preemption).
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ERISA gives no guidance to the courts on whether medical malpractice
claims are preempted by ERISA and in this regard there is much latitude as
to whether a suit is allowed." 0
B. PROHIBITION ON THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

Similarly, a prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine has
prevented managed care entities from being held legally accountable for
treatment decisions."' State health laws insulate HMOs from being sued
for medical malpractice because they provide that direct or indirect health
services by an HMO will not be considered the practice of medicine."
Moreover, some states have adopted malpractice statutes that impose
limitations on medical liability. These statutes commonly apply to health
care providers or to those practicing medicine.' 3
For example, in Dalton v. Peninsula Hospital Center,'" the trial court
dismissed the complaint against the HMO on the basis that a medical
malpractice claim against an HMO was barred by the Public Health Law
and any state law claims based on negligence and breach of contract were
preempted by ERISA." 5 Similarly, in Williams v. Good Health Plus,
Inc." 6 the court held that because the HMO could not practice medicine
7
under Texas law the HMO could not be liable for alleged negligence."
These cases exemplify how the wording of state statutes and public laws
with regard to medical malpractice and the practice of medicine give
managed care organizations another defense when they are sued for medical
malpractice.

110. Cf. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (wrongful
death claim preempted) and Elsesser v. Hosp. of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 795 F.Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (medical malpractice claim not preempted).
111. Texas: Governor Lets HMO Liability Bill Become Law, Cites Potentialfor Good,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, May 23, 1997 at d2.
112. Steven E. Pegalis, State Law Has Not Kept Up With Managed Care, 14 No. 5
MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 4 (Mar. 1997).
113. James F. Henry, Liability of Managed Care OrganizationsAfter Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare;An Elemental Analysis, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 702 (1996-97). Some states
have adopted statutory immunity for licensed HMOs by providing that an HMO may not be
deemed as practicing medicine, or simply exempting managed care organizations from
liability. Id.
114. 626 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
115. Id. at 364.
116. 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
117. Id. See also Pickett v. CIGNA Healthplan of Tex. Inc., 1993 WL 209858 (Tex.
App. Ct. 1993).
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IV. TEXAS LEGISLATION
While ERISA and state statutes often compel courts to reach the
decision of holding HMOs free from liability for medical malpractice
involving utilization review, there is concern as to the effect this has on an
injured plaintiff."' Likewise, there is much criticism that the practice of
medicine has changed because of HMOs, while the law has remained the
same." 9 Concerned with the inability to hold managed care organizations
liable for negligent medical decisions, Texas became the first state to pass
legislation that would alter the protection of HMOs in medical malpractice
suits. 2
Prior to 1997, doctors in Texas could be sued for medical malpractice
while HMOs could not.'
This is because in Texas the assertion of a
health care liability claim is controlled by the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act of Texas. 122 The Act defines a "health care
liability claim" as "a cause of action against a health care provider or
physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from
accepted standards of medical care."' 23 Thus, under the Medical Liability
Act, claims could only be brought against health care providers or
physicians. Since HMOs were not licensed by the state to provide health
care or to serve as physicians, HMOs could not be sued for malpractice. 2
Thus, even though HMOs made decisions as to what type and how much
treatment a patient should receive, under the Texas Medical Practice Act,

118. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338. The court in its decision stated that when
Congress passed ERISA, cost containment features, such as the one at issue in the case, did
not exist and that "such fundamental changes such as the widespread institution of utilization
review would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its
noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees." Id. The court used a fairly narrow
reading with regard to the preemption issue.
119. Pegalis, supra note, 112 at 4.
120. S.B. 386, 75th Leg. (Tex. 1997).
121. Darrin Schlegel, Senate Passes HMO Reform, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 7,
1997 at IA.
122. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
123. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1998); See also
Pickett v. CIGNA Healthplan of Tex., Inc., No. 01-92-00803-cv, 1993 WL 209858 (Tex.
App. (1st Dist.) June 17, 1993).
124. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The Act
defines health care providers as "any person, partnership, professional association,
corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed or chartered by the state of Texas to provide
health care as a registered nurse, hospital, dentist, podiatrist, pharmacist, or nursing home,
or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment."
HMOs are not considered to fall into any of these categories.
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HMOs were not considered eligible to practice medicine.'25 Due to the
wording of the Texas statutes governing the practice of medicine, 126
Texas courts did not allow HMOs to be sued for medical malpractice. 2 7
As such, managed care entities in Texas were not held legally accountable
for medical treatment decisions because these entities alleged a defense that

they were prohibited from practicing medicine and, therefore, could not be

negligent in the practice of medicine."
Concerned that every industry except managed care could be held liable
for its actions or inactions,'29 Senator David Sibley introduced a bill dur-

ing the 75th Texas legislative session that would make HMOs responsible
for negligent decisions which resulted in patient injury.' The bill was

backed by the Texas Medical Association, 3 ' a physician oriented group.
Opponents of the bill,' which included employers, HMOs, and business

groups, warned that allowing such lawsuits would increase the cost of
insurance to consumers.' 33 Texas Governor George W. Bush allowed the

125. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 1.03(12) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The
Medical Practice Act states that a person is considered to practice medicine within the Act:
who shall publicly profess to be a physician or surgeon and shall diagnose, treat
or offer to treat any disease or disorder, mental or physical, or any physical
deformity or injury by any system or method or to effect cures thereof; or who
shall diagnose, treat, or offer to treat any disease or disorder, mental or physical
or any physical deformity or injury by any system or method and to effect cures
thereof and charge thereof, directly or indirectly, money or other compensation.
126. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1998); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 1.03(12) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
127. See Pickett, 1993 WL 209858 (holding that any act or omission of negligence by
the HMO involves the practice of medicine which is barred by the statute); William v. Good
Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App. Ct. 1987) (holding HMO could not be held
liable for alleged negligence because it was incapable of practicing medicine according to
the statute).
128. Texas: Governor Lets HMO Liability Bill Become Law, Cites Potentialfor Good,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY May 23, 1997 at d2.
129. Suzanne Gamboa, Senate OKs bill on Liability for HMOs, AUsTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Mar. 18, 1997 at IA.
130. Schlegel, supra note 121, at IA.
131. Darrin Schlegel, Putting the Squeeze on HMOs, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 2,
1997 at 10A.
132. Managed Care: Texas, Missouri Considering Bills on HMO Liability for Poor
Outcomes, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 12, 1997 at d2. Employers are one of the
opponents to the bill because of fear that litigation costs will be passed on to them in higher
premiums.
133. John Moritz, Senate PassesBillfor HMO Liability, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Mar. 18, 1997 at 4.
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bill" 3 to become law without his signature.135 The law, which went into
effect on September 1, 1997,136 made Texas the first state to allow people
to sue managed care plans for medical malpractice where their decisions
regarding treatment caused injury. 37 The new law will undoubtedly affect
many Texans as statistics indicate that approximately 20% of Texans are
enrolled in HMOs and another 40% belong to Preferred Provider Organizations. 138
The new Texas law has created two ways to sue health plans and
physicians for medical malpractice. 139 The first way to sue is based on
liability through a duty to exercise ordinary care." 4 It has been argued
that managed care organizations influence, sometimes even make, medical
decisions and should be held liable for such decisions when the results are
injurious. 4 ' The second cause of action is based on holding managed care
organizations liable based on decisions made by employees or agents acting
on an organization's behalf. 42
V. LEGISLATIVE EFFECTS

Texas is the first state to pass legislation which might make it possible
to successfully sue managed care entities for medical malpractice.' 43 In
passing the new law, Texas legislators sought to eliminate defenses used by
managed care entities in malpractice suits. However, the new law may not
be enough where a defense for managed care entities remains.
Prior to the 1997 legislation, HMOs often used the defense that the
corporate practice of medicine is forbidden by statute. 44 The new law
now provides that "a health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization or other managed care entity for a health care plan has the duty to

134. S.B. 386, 75th Leg. (Tex. 1997). The newly passed bill allows health maintenance
organizations and other managed care entities to be sued for medical malpractice when a
treatment decision adversely affects a patient's health.
135. Health Care-Managed Care: More States Join Nationwide Trend of Regulating
Managed Care Networks, 66 USLW 2026, July 8, 1997.
136. Id.
137. Schlegel, supra note 131, at 10A.
138. Schlegel, supra note 131, at 10A.
139. Texas: Governor Lets HMO Liability Bill Become Law, Cites Potential for Good,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, May 23, 1997 at d2.
140. Id.
141. Texas: Bill to Hold Managed Care Plans Liable for Medical Decisions Passes
Senate, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Mar. 19, 1997 at d2.
142. Id.
143. Schlegel, supra note 121, at IA.
144. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 103(12) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions and is
liable for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by
its failure to exercise such ordinary care."'' 45 Under this section, the
legislature established a standard of care under which managed care
organizations must act in making their medical decisions. Failure to
exercise such care subjects the health care plan to claims for medical
malpractice. Ultimately, a medical decision which results in injury to the
patient may subject both the doctor and the HMO to a medical malpractice
claim.
Breach of care is not the only way in which managed care organizations can be held liable under the new law. A second cause of action under
the new statute holds managed care entities "liable for damages for harm to
an insured or enrollee proximately caused by the health care treatment
decisions made by its: (1) employees; (2) agents; (3) ostensible agents; or
(4) representatives who are acting on its behalf and over whom it has the
right to exercise influence or control or has actually exercised influence or
control which results in failure to exercise ordinary care."' This second
cause of action appears to be nothing more than an agency theory. However,
the law does more than create another agency theory. Utilization review is
the approval or denial of payment for medical treatment and should not
decide medical treatment. However, if payment for certain treatment is
denied, a patient usually forgoes the treatment because they cannot afford
to pay for the treatment themselves. In such situations, utilization review
in fact influences or controls the type and quantity of treatment a doctor
gives a patient because the treatment is based on what will be paid for.
Thus, when such treatment or lack of treatment causes injury then both the
doctor and health care plan should be held liable. This second cause of
action is especially important for bringing malpractice claims against
managed care entities that use pre-certification or utilization review that
require an employee or agent of the managed care entity to give approval
47
for medical treatment or tests prior to providing them to the patient.
The decisions of whether and what medical services to provide will now be
subject to claims for malpractice if the decisions proximately cause the harm
to the patient.

145. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., Ch. 163, § 88.002(a) (Tex. 1997).

146. Id.
147. Along with S.B. (386), the Texas legislature also passed a bill (S.B. 384) which
requires that personnel performing utilization review functions be nurses, physician assistants
or other licensed providers of the same quality as the utilization review agent.
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The new Texas law appears to be in direct contradiction with the Texas
statute regarding the practice of medicine. 4 8 In fact, the Texas legislature
saw this problem and resolved it by providing "nothing in any law of this
state prohibiting a health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization,
or other managed care entity from practicing medicine or being licensed to
practice medicine may be asserted as a defense by such health insurance
carrier, health maintenance organization, or other managed care entity in an
action brought against it pursuant to this section or any other law."' 149
Because of the new law, the prohibition against the corporate practice of
medicine is no longer a viable defense for managed care entities in Texas.
The new Texas law appears to be a positive sign for medical malpractice plaintiffs. However, the new law may still allow a very important and
viable defense for HMOs-ERISA preemption. Since the specific section
of ERISA provides that the ERISA statute "shall supercede any and all state
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan,' " 5 ERISA will supercede the Texas state law where plaintiffs have
health plans as part of employee benefit plans. This ERISA clause has been
broadly interpreted to preempt statutes that govern benefit plans and state
common law actions pertaining to welfare benefit plans. 5 ' Despite the
new law, ERISA preemption as a defense will still affect many Texans who
try to sue HMOs for medical malpractice.' 52 Managed care plans prefer
Since ERISA
ERISA to state laws because of the remedies involved.'
clearly preempts claims involving an HMO's administration, type, or extent
of benefits provided under an employee benefit plan plaintiffs will need to
find a way to avoid ERISA altogether. A plaintiff can avoid ERISA if the

148. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 1.03(12) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
149. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., Ch. 163, § 88.002(b) (Tex. 1997).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1991).
151. Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987). However not all relevant state law is preempted by
ERISA. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. at 106 (holding that a state law that is
"too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" will not be preempted by ERISA).
152. About 20% of all Texans are enrolled in HMOs and another 40% belong to
Preferred Provider Organizations, another form of managed care. Schlegel, supra note 131
at 10A. The new law will only affect about 5% of insured people because many Texans are
covered by plans with federal protection from lawsuits. Moritz, supra note 133, at 4.
153. Liability: Court Set to Hear Oral Arguments on ERISA Preemption in Injury Suit,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 30, 1997 at d3. Remedies available under ERISA are
limited to reinstatement in the plan, reimbursement for benefits which the plaintiff paid for,
making the plan whole, or giving a benefit which was denied and should have been given.
State malpractice remedies are broader and usually cover lost wages, the cost of rehabilitation
or additional medical treatment required after the injury, and pain and suffering. Id.
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claim does not involve a direct claim to recover plan benefits, a claim5 4to
enforce rights under the plan, or a claim to clarify future plan benefits.
When faced with a medical malpractice lawsuit, managed care entities
are likely to argue ERISA preemption on the basis that the lawsuit is an
attempt to recover benefits under the employee's benefit plan. In essence,
the HMO will attempt to characterize a plaintiffs complaint as a denial of
benefits claim within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of
ERISA or as being related to the plan under section 514(a) of ERISA.
However, a plaintiff may be successful in avoiding ERISA if a court accepts
a quantity versus quality distinction such as the one made in Dukes v.
United States Healthcare, Inc., 55 a recent Third Circuit case.
The Dukes case involved plaintiffs who filed suit in state court claiming
damages for injuries arising from the medical malpractice of HMO-affiliated
hospitals and medical personnel. 15 6 The defendant HMO argued that the
medical care had been obtained as a benefit from a welfare-benefit plan and
thus the claims were preempted by ERISA. 57 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, disagreed with the lower courts and held that the
complete preemption exception was inapplicable and that removal of the
claims from state court was improper.158 The court recognized that the
complaint dealt with the low quality of the medical treatment the plaintiffs
received.' 59 In this manner, the ERISA statute says nothing about the
quality of benefits received but rather the statute is concerned exclusively
with whether or not the benefits due under the plan were actually provided."6 Furthermore, in looking at the legislative history the Third Circuit
found nothing to suggest that section 502, the civil enforcement section, was
intended to control the quality of the benefits received by plan participants.16' The court interpreted Congress' silence on quality control of
benefits as an area for state regulation. 162
The Third Circuit's decision focused on the quality of the benefits
received versus the quantity of benefits and, in effect, found that a claim for
negligent care dealt with the quality of the treatment or care and not the
quantity. However, as the court recognized, the distinction between quality
154. Jurisdiction:MalpracticeSuit Against HMO ProvidersNot Removable to Federal
District Court, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 6, 1995 at dl0.
155. 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
156. Id. at 351.
157.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 357.
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.

Id.
Id.
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and quantity is not always clear.'63 Since there is no bright line distinction, this leaves open the possibility that a complaint which is based solely
on the quality of care may still be subject to ERISA preemption "if the
quality of... care will be so low that the treatment received simply will not
qualify as health care at all."' 64 The claim is now actionable under
ERISA section 502(a) and subject to complete preemption because a denial
of benefits falls within the civil enforcement section which is to be governed
solely by ERISA. Dukes, however, gives no guidance in dealing with
conflict preemption and, thus, conflict preemption is left wide open to court
interpretation to decide if ERISA preempts the state law claim.
Furthermore, a state law claim based on negligent utilization review
may also escape preemption under ERISA if the utilization review can be
shown to fall within the "business of insurance."'' 65 This is commonly
known as the "savings clause"'" which exempts state laws that regulate
insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA's preemption clause. To
maintain a common law negligence claim against an insurer, a plaintiff must
establish not only that the utilization review at issue falls within the practice
of insurance, 67 but also that the state law on which action is based
actually regulates insurance. 68 Because of public policy, state common
law actions are rarely sustained unless the state common law cause of action
is specifically directed toward the practice of insurance and the state law
affects all business of insurance in the state. 69 Under Metropolitan
Life7 ° the state law must regulate the substantive content of the insurance
policy' 7' to avoid ERISA preemption.
Unless the new Texas law regulates insurance, a state law claim for
medical malpractice, because of utilization review, will not withstand ERISA
preemption. This will be a big hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome as the new
law was not intended to regulate insurance.
The new law in no way

163. Id. See also Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F.Supp. 113 (D.Md. 1996).
164. Id. at 358.

165. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).

166. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44-45 (1987).
167. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). This case sets
forth three factors as relevant in determining if a particular practice is within "the business
of insurance": (1) whether the practice "transferred or spread" a risk; (2) whether the practice
was an integral part of the contractual relationship; (3) whether the practice was limited to
organizations within the insurance industry. Id.
168. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (1985).
169. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (1987).
170. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
171. Id. at 746.
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regulates the substantive contents of insurance policies.' 72 Instead, the
new law was intended to extend liability to managed care entities who were
negligent in medical decisions. The new law does not regulate with
specificity the manner in which managed care entities must operate, but
instead sets a duty to exercise ordinary care in the course of their business.
Likewise, the law does not control the terms of insurance, nor is the law
aimed at the insurance industry by affecting all business of insurance in the
state, but rather at the health care industry and those providing health care
services. 17 3 As such, it will be difficult for a plaintiff to make an argument that the new Texas law regulates insurance and, therefore, their cause
of action under the state law is not preempted by ERISA.
The immediate effect of the new Texas law appears to be minor since
the law eliminates the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine
defense. Yet, because many Texans have health plans through employee
welfare plans, ERISA still applies and the new law does nothing to the
larger hurdle of ERISA preemption. In the larger scheme of things,
however, the new law may have a more positive effect nationally. Texas
was the first state to pass a law regarding HMO liability and since then has
set a precedent for other states to follow. On June 25, 1997, Missouri
Governor Mel Carnahan signed into law a bill (HB 335) that removes
HMOs' exemption from liability for poor medical outcomes including
174
permitting medical malpractice claims to be brought against HMOs.
Similarly, on June 3, 1997, Governor Roy Romer of Colorado signed a bill
(HB 1122) establishing standards for the adequacy of managed care
Governor Bob Miller of Nevada signed a managed care
networks.1'
reform bill on June 9, 1997, aimed at ensuring that access and quality of
care are not sacrificed in the name of cost containment. 176 These are just
a few of the states that have passed new laws regarding HMO liability in the
wake of Texas taking the first step. 177 As managed care entities become
more widespread throughout the nation, more states may decide to follow
172. Moritz, supra note 133, at 4. There is indication that the new law will still be
subject to ERISA preemption because many Texans are covered by insurance plans with
federal protection from lawsuits. Id.
173. S.B. 386, 75th Leg. (Tex. 1997). The law is being added to the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code of the Texas statutes and not to the Insurance Code.
174. Health Care-ManagedCare: More States Join Nationwide Trend of Regulating
Managed Care Networks, 66 USLW 2026, July 8, 1997.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Several other states, including California, had bills before the legislature regarding
the same type of liability. Florida attempted to pass a similar law, but Governor Lawton
Chiles refused to sign the bill into law.
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in Texas' footsteps and pass legislation extending liability. However, even
if all 50 states eventually pass such legislation, many HMOs and other
managed care entities will still remain insulated from liability because of the
federal ERISA statute. In order to hold HMOs liable for medical malpractice in the same way that doctors are, it will be necessary for Congress to
take some sort of action with regard to ERISA.
When ERISA was originally passed by Congress in 1974, Congress
could not imagine how the statute would affect managed care because
managed care was not as evolved as it is in present day form. As it stands
now, certain portions of the federal ERISA law are outdated and, in its
current form, should not be allowed to be used as a defense for managed
care entities. Congress' intent in passing ERISA was to protect employees
and to ensure that employees received the appropriate benefits from
employers who offered benefits. By allowing current managed care entities
to use ERISA as a defense, the ERISA statute is doing the opposite of what
Congress intended. ERISA often protects managed care entities from
lawsuits for medical malpractice in instances when utilization review is used
because the managed care entity alleges that the utilization review and the
health care benefits relate to a welfare benefit, thus making the suit subject
to ERISA preemption. The decisions for treatment which result in injury
allow a plaintiff to either recover for a benefit which was not given or
reimbursement for the benefit. However, reimbursement is inadequate
because the plaintiff must have paid for the treatment on their own. Injured
plaintiffs usually cannot afford the treatment and thus forego the treatment.
Similarly, if recovery for a benefit is attempted the person must still be
eligible for the benefit; this means the person must be living. In instances
where the lack of treatment has resulted in death, there is no remedy then
available under ERISA. If benefits are provided to an employee, those
benefits are to be governed by ERISA; but as the law stands now, it allows
for substandard benefits to be given to employees with no recourse for
employees who are injured. In order for Congress' original intent to be
carried out with regard to ERISA, it will be necessary for the current
Congress to make amendments to ERISA so that the federal law becomes
current with the changing form of welfare benefits.
CONCLUSION

With the increase in the cost of medical care growing, it remains
important to find a way to keep the cost of health care down. While
managed care entities are currently the best solution to decreasing costs, the
use of managed care entities does not come without problems. Managed
care entities are taking a bigger role in medical services, often going as far
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as making medical decisions and judgments by deciding what care will be
paid for in order to cut costs. The use of managed care entities has now
become big business. In the same manner that corporations are held liable
for their decisions and actions, managed care entities should be no
exception. They should be held liable for their decisions when the decisions
to deny payment for certain treatments result in injury. Current state law
has not kept up with the changing managed care field and in the few
instances that it has, the law has not gone far enough to protect consumers.
The new law passed by Texas is a step in the right direction with regard to
managed care liability. Through the new law, Texas has taken away an
avenue of defense by disallowing the prohibition on the corporate practice
of medicine for managed care entities. More states should follow Texas'
lead by passing similar legislation to protect their citizens. However, the
state laws alone will not be enough because the federal ERISA law still
protects managed care entities. In order for the law to catch up to the
managed care field, it will be necessary for Congress to amend the federal
law in a manner by which injured consumers can successfully sue managed
care entities and recover for the cost of their injuries. To do so may require
that the remedies available under ERISA be changed. Furthermore,
Congress may simply need to clarify how utilization review fits into ERISA
so that courts nationwide are consistent in deciding whether such claims are
Society holds even the common layperson
preempted by ERISA.
responsible for his negligent decisions, it is now time to hold the managed
care entities responsible for their decisions as well.
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